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EVOLUTION AND FUNCTIONS OF CENTRAL BANKS
By
S. Ibi Ajayi*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Today's lecture takes us far into history: that of the Evolution of Central Banks, as
well as the functions of central banks. The central bank of a country is regarded as the apex
regulatory institution of the financial system of that country. Accordingly, "a central bank
is an institution charged with the responsibility of regulating the supply, availability and
the cost of money in the interest of social welfare", (Ajayi, 1995). It has regulatory
authority over all other financial institutions in promoting financial stability and a sound
financial system. The importance and relevance of a central bank in any society can not be
overemphasized. There is hardly any country today without a central bank. In Africa,
having a central bank was considered the "sine qua non" of political independence. As
noted by the then President of Ghana, Kwame Nkrumah ( 1961), "our political
independence will be worthless unless we use it to obtain economic and financial selfgovernment and independence." Consequently, central banks in Africa are state-owned and
have powerful roles in macro-economic policy making.
All over the world, governments have taken necessary measures to ensure the
integration of central banking more closely into the machinery for carrying out macroeconomic policy and for many countries, a central bank plays a key role in a country's
growth and development process. The traditional role of the central bank is the regulation
of the stock of money in such a way as to promote the social welfare. As we shall see in
the course of this paper, the roles of a central bank in an economy are necessarily
influenced by a host of factors such as the features of the monetary system, the organisation
of financial markets, the political and sometimes ideological environment, and the stage of
economic development (Ajayi, 1995). Given the complexities of monetary management
and the complexities of the structures of the economy in an increasingly globalised world,
the issue of financial system soundness has shifted to the centre stage in the last two
decades and more so recently in the period since the Asian crisis. In fact, the world of
central banking is one of a variety of structures, functions and powers which are in
themselves by-products of the economic, political and other realities prevailing in that
society. The powers, constellation of functions, broad orientation and techniques of central
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banks differ from country to country. The functions of central banks from one country to
the other are not time invariant.
The aim of this paper is to provide a background for much of the details that is going
to be presented in other sections of this policy seminar. There will definitely be overlaps.
The organisation of the rest of this paper is as follows. Section II discusses the evolution
of central banks in a number of countries around the world including a discussion of central
banking in Nigeria. In section III we discuss the functions of central banks in general and
with specific reference to that of the Central Bank of Nigeria. The relationship between
Government and central banks and the issue of independence is the theme of section IV.
We discuss the issues of independence with specific reference to the Central Bank of
Nigeria. We end up with a discussion of some of the problems and prospects for central
banking in section V.

II.

EVOLUTION OF CENTRAL BANKSl

The Bank of England
The history of central banks dates back to the time the Bank of England was
established. It is known to be one of the oldest central banks in the world. The conception
of central banking in the modern sense started with the creation of the Central Bank of
England. It, however, took mainly the complex financial problems that wars and economic
crises produced to accord it the distinctive roles that should be given to it both in practice
and theory of finance (Ajayi, 1995). The various economic, political and social changes
which occurred between the two world wars gave it the principles and operations which
brought it into the centre stage. The older central banks (including those of England),
Sweden and France had their origin as a rule in their ability to serve their respective
government financially. When the Bank of England was incorporated in 1694, it granted a
loan of 1.2 million pounds, the amount of the bank's entire capital, to the government of
William ill to finance the war of the Grand Alliance against France (1689- 97). In exchange
for the generous offer, government permitted the Bank of England to carry on general
banking business including the right to buy and sell coin and bullion, to deal in bills of
exchange, to issue its own notes and to make loans. The subsequent extensions of the
Bank's charter coincided with additional loans to the government. Thus, the Bank of
England has from the beginning served as the government's banker. Commercial banks
soon found it convenient to keep deposits with the Bank of England since the latter was the
principal issuer of notes. Supplies of notes by these commercial banks and joint stock
companies could be obtained in times of need by drawing on their deposits.
By the middle of the nineteenth century, the Bank of England had become a bankers'
bank. The legislation passed in 1833 granted its notes legal power while that prerogative
/.
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was denied to other banks. The Bank Act of 1844 (Peel's Act) provided that no new bank
in the United Kingdom could issue notes and placed restrictions on existing note-issuing
banks with the result that the Bank of England became eventually the only note issuing
bank in England and Wales.
During the nineteenth century, however, the Bank was beset by one crisis after
another. Excessive lending by banks brought on the crises of 1825 and 1837, when many
banks failed. It was not until 1837, that the Bank of England started to show concern by
acting as a lender of last resort. The banking crises led to a demand for parliamentary
intervention to regulate barupnt. _and more particularly to control the issue of notes. The
crisis generated a debate among two popular schools of thought (i.e. the Currency vs. the
Banking Schools). The Currency School viewed that the only way to prevent an over-issue
'
of notes was to insist that the note issue be fully backed by gold, or at least by fiduciary
issue. The Banking Schoo],, however, believed that the note issue should not be rigidly
restricted, but that it shqulq be made variable to suit the particular needs of business at the
time. The Currency School tended to over-emphasize the dangers attendant on an excessive
issue of notes, while the opposing school was inclined to minimise them.
In the later part of the nineteen century, the Bank of England began to develop as a
true central bank, and it was during this period that it learnt how to use the bank rate as an
instrument of monetary policy. The Bank of England fully accepted the responsibilities of
a central bank and became used to exercising its powers of control over the commercial
banks. It is apparent from the above discussion that the Bank of England developed slowly
and only by a kind of evolutionary process did it come to occupy a pivotal position in the
national monetary and banking system in England.

.

The Bank of France and the Bank of Germany

Both the Bank of France and Reichsbank of Germany are of great historical
significance. The Bank of France was founded by Napoleon Bonaparte in 1800 mainly for
the purposes of providing through note issue a uniform and stable currency. Although
privately managed, it had close relationship with government from the beginning. The
existing commercial banks were merged with the Bank of France by government edict,
which explains the genesis of the duality of the bank as central bank and a commercial
bank. The bank was nationlised in 1945.
In 1765, Frederick the Great founded the Koenigliche bank as a purely state
institution. It had no stockholders, issued no bank notes and had no chequing accounts, but
it discounted bills, and made loans against commodities and real estate. Soon after the
German empire was founded, it was made in 1875 into a central bank called Reichsbank
and steps were taken to give it a monopoly of bank-note issue. After some experimentation
with interim central banking patterned after the American system, a single bank called
Deutsche Bundesbank was established in 1957. Even though both France and Germany
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also had central banks in the nineteen century, none of them had the same powers and
influences over the other banks as had the Bank of England.
The Riksbank of Sweden

The Riksbank of Sweden was founded in 1656 to serve the banking needs of the
Swedish Merchant guild, but was reorganised under government auspices two years later.
While it enjoyed in its earlier years the monopoly in the issue of notes, the joint-stock
banks which came into prominence after 1830 assumed the note issue prerogative.
Government however systematically eliminated the note issue privilege of other banks
through legislation and greatly extended other powers of the Riksbank. and gave it a status
which is comparable to those of other countries central banks.
United States of America: The Evolution of the Federal Reserve System

Prior to the twentieth century, the United States of America did not have a full-fledged
Central Bank. The rise of the banking system paralleled the development of the monetary
system. In order to facilitate the financing of the revolutionary war, the first modem bank
in the United States, the Bank of North America was incorporated in Philadelphia in 1782.
This was followed by similar institutions in Massachusetts and New York. Congress in
1791 chartered the First Bank of the United States. The majority of the stock of the bank
was owned privately. It performed some central banking functions by providing fiscal
agency services for the infant federal government; and performing some monetary
discipline relating to the redemption of state bank note issues. The conservative policy of
the bank drew attack from agrarian-frontier group. The charter of the bank lapsed in 1811
and the issue of state bank notes continued unabated. The mounting abuses were called into
some kind of order in 1816 when the Second Bank of the United States was federally
chartered. It faced the same stiff opposition as its predecessor. Its central banking function
especially its control over currency issues by state banks were incompatible with both its
private ownership and its commercial banking business. Persistent opposition to the bank
supported by President Andrew Jackson led to the refusal of Congress to extend the bank's
charter in 1836.
Following the demise of the Second Bank of United States, what is called the era of
"wildcat" banking came into existence. With the great vacuum created by the absence of a
nationally recognised central bank, state banks in existence offered varied paper currency.
The absence of a central bank and the multiplicity of bank notes of various forms and
quality were detrimental to the take-off stage of the new economy. Frequent banking and
financial panics, and periods of severe credit shortages attested to the defects of the
existing system. The damage done to the economic system led to the appointment of a
National Monetary Commission which in studying the nation's banking and monetary
system provided essential information and recommendations leading to the legislation
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establishing a central banking system for the United States in the form of the Federal
Reserve System. The new central banking system was established under the administration
of Woodrow Wilson through the Federal Reserve Act of 1913. Unlike the European
countries each of which has a single central bank, the United States has a system of Federal
Reserve Banks, one for each of the 12 Federal Reserve districts. Each Federal Reserve
Bank is named for the city in which it is located hence the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York, the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago and so on. For some of the functions of central
banking, the regional character of the system is important.
Over the decades, the Federal Reserve structure has become more centralised. The
making of macro-economic policy has become centralised in Washington in two
policymaking bodies: the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, and the Federal
Open Market Committee. The former is made up of seven members (called governors)
appointed by the President of the United States with the advice and consent of senate for a
term of 14 years. One of the members of board is appointed by the President as chairman.
The Open Market Committee which has the responsibility for open market operations has
12 voting members made up of the 7 members of the Board of Governors and 5 of the
presidents of the regional Federal Banks. The presidents of the regional banks serve on a
rotational basis with the notable exception of the president of the New York Bank (the bank
charged with carrying out open market operations) who is always a voting member of the
Open Market Committee. No doubt the system has undergone fundamental changes as a
result of the experiences gained from the great depression and subsequent experimentation
with the system. Just as the banking system of the United States developed in stages, the
structure as well as the operations of the Federal Reserve System has evolved gradually in
response to the complexity and changing needs of the United States economy.
Evolution of other Central Banks
Apart from the Federal Reserve System of the United States, other central banks were
established mostly in the first and second half of the present century. These include the
South African Reserve Bank, 1921; Commonwealth Bank of Australia, 1924; the Central
Bank of China, 1928; the Bank of Canada, 1934; the Reserve Bank of India, and the State
Bank of Pakistan, 1935. A phenomenal growth in the number of Central Banks in Africa
took place in the 1950s. These include the Bank of Ghana, 1957; the Central Bank of
Tunisia, 1958; Bank of Morocco, 1959; and the Central Bank of Nigeria, 1959. Central
banks founded in the 1960s in Africa include the Bank of Sudan, the Bank of the Republic
of Guinea, and the Somali National Bank, 1960; the Central Bank of Algeria, 1963; in
1964, the following were founded: the National Bank of Rwanda, the Bank of the Republic
of Burundi, the Reserve Bank of Malawi and the Bank of Zambia.
One innovation after the world war Il had been the establishment of central banks to
serve a group of countries. One of these is the Banque Centrale des Etats de l'Afrique de
l'Ouest (termed the West African Central Bank).
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Nigeria: The Evolution of the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN)
The develo pme nt of the Central Bank of Nigeria was a n outgrowth of the
characteristics and deficiencies of the period preceding its existence. The first institution in
existence was the West African Currency Board which was established in 19 12 and was the
currency issuing authority. Consequent upon the c riticisms of the system, Mr. Loynes was
appointed to make recomme ndations on the establishment of a Nigerian Central Bank, the
introduction of a N igerian c urrency and other associated matters. In the 1940s and 1950s,
Nigeria's financial sector witnessed a turbulent period culminating in the collapses of many
indigenous owned private and state banks. Banking business during this time was
domina ted by foreign banks, while only fe w Nigerians were involved and trained in the art
of banking. The enactment of the Nigerian Banking Ordinance in 1952 introduced some
regula tion into the banking sector and c urtailed to some exte nt the bank failures of noregulation era. The condition of the economy be tween 1952 and 1958, and the minimal
regulation of the banking industry by the 1952 Ordinance, gave impetus to the
establishment of many indigenous banks, all of which failed. The general collapse was the
resultant effec ts of several factors including poor manageme nt, undercapitalisation and
high degree of indiscipline. The regulatory void c reated led to the establishme nt of an
institution that would not only oversee and regulate the behavio ur of the institutions in the
financial sector, but also carry out stabilisation policy generally.
The era of proper banking regulatio n began with the enactment of the Central Bank
of Nigeria Act of 1958. The Act was necessitated by the need to eliminate the deficiencies
in the financial sector, promote and integrate the Nigerian financial sector, stem the tide of
bank failures and promote the growth of the do mestic money and capital markets among
others. The Bank commenced business in July 1959. At different times, the powers of the
Central Bank of Nigeria were enhanced. The promulgation of the CBN Decree 24 of 1991
and the Banking and Othe r Financial Institutions Decree (BOFID) No. 25 of 199 1 was
another milestone in central banking history because o f the powers confe rred on the Bank
to perform the mode rn primary functions o f a central bank. Together with BOFID, the CBN
Decree confers larger powers on the Bank in the areas o f banking supervision and
examination, mone tary management and promotion o f safety measures and soundness of
the finan cial syste m . While these changes are welcome develo pments, some have argued
that the CBN has not achieved much in the area of independent selection of suitable
instrume nts to achie ve its objectives. S imilarly, not much has been done by the recent
amendments on the issue of central bank autonomy.+

+ Editor's Nott: Prof Ajayi wrote thil papu before the CBN was granted instrument autonomy by the government
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ill. FUNCTIONS OF CENTRAL BANKS
In the course of discussing the evolution of central banks, we found that the various
functions performed by the modem central banks developed gradually and according to
changing circumstances. Many of the earlier central banks in Western Europe, for example,
evolved in their various functions. The monetary problems at the time of establishment of
the relevant central banks and the need to eliminate deficiencies in the financial system and
economy resulted in the many responsibilities of the modem central banks. In a general
context, the functions of central banks all over the world as listed in traditional texts on
central banking consist of the following:

(i) regulating the issue of currency and controlling the quantity of money and credit for
monetary policy purposes. This is the same as saying that it is the function of the
Central Bank to issue currency in adequate quantity for the smooth running of the
economy.
(ii) acting as banker to the government or acting as the fi scal agent of government.
(iii) acting as banker to the commercial banks - including the lender of last resort
function.
(iv) managing the country's international reserves as well as its exchange rate.
In carrying out these functions, central banks are usually given some powers under
the act establishing them. The type of powers and each central bank's style of carrying out
its functions inevitably varies between one country and the other. The type of techniques
used by central banks to adequately mop excess liquidity through open market operations,
for example, depends crucially on the stage of development of the money market.
In addition to the functions mentioned above, central banks have additional functions
especially in developing countries. Such functions include first, the regulatory and
supervisory role in order to ensure the efficient running of the financial system. The second
is the promotional role of the central bank. Central banks are expected to foster the
development of financial infrastructures such as the development of money and capital
markets, the instruments of the market and the development of specialised financial
institutions.
It is not my intention to bore this honourable listeners given their excellent academic
background with the details of these various functions. You all have them at the tip of your
fingers. Indeed these functions have been described in an earlier paper presented to the
research department in a seminar some years ago (See Ajayi, 1995). At this juncture, it will
suffice to point out the distinction in the role of central banking in a well developed
economy and that of a developing economy like ours. In this regard, I like to point out first
that the specific role of any central bank is affected by many variables among which are
the nature and type of government, the courage and professionalism of the man at the
helms of affairs at the central bank, the stage of economic development and the structure
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of financial markets. Second, central banking in developing countries faces many
limitations. These include the fact that the econo!T)y outside the realms of money may be
very large. Many names such as the " informal sector", the "underground economy" have
been given to this phenomenon. The point is that to the extent that the size of the informal
sector is large, it may have serious effects on the role of the central banks and its
effectiveness in performing its functions. Third, in many African countries, for example,
cash is the main mode of payments as opposed to checking accounts. The personal
disadvantages of carrying cash in our country and the deleterious effects on the growth of
financial deepening are enormous. Fourth, the money and capital markets are not
developed. There is shallowness in its depth and breadth. This inevitably affects the choice
of policy instruments. Fifth, in many developing countries, short run changes in the volume
of money reflects the fiscal action of government and the balance of payments. In the case
of the former the central bank may have little or no control and in the case of the latter,
sterilization possibilities may be limited.
There are a number of subtle differences between central banks around the world. We
can draw examples from that of the Federal Reserve System (referred to as the FED) of the
United States and the Bank of England. The Bank of England also performs most of the
functions as the Fed, although, there are some differences and exceptions. The American
banking system is a little more complex than the British system, partly on account of the
size of US economy and the state and federal laws governing banking. lo organisational
structure, both the Bank of England and the Federal Reserve System are different,
consequently, the processes of achieving the same results may be dissimilar. There are a
number of Federal Reserves (FEDs) as against one central bank in Great Britain. When
short of cash, American member banks borrow from their central bank, whereas British
commercial banks never do this directly, but instead call in some of their loans to the
money market, thereby compelling bill brokers and discount houses to borrow from the
Bank of England. Thus, the higher rate charged by the Bank of England serves to check
lending to the money market. The FED do not have the same check, for the fear that the
banks may be regarded by their customers and general public as unhealthy or distressed.
Monetary policy is a matter to be decided jointly by the Treasury and the Bank of England
whereas in the US the FED working through the open market committee is independent.
For all central banks, it is becoming increasingly clear that the maintenance of
monetary stability is the key to economic policy. Thus the maintenance of a noninflationary environment is seen as the major task of central banks. Several conclusions
emerge from the existing literature on this issue (IMF, 1996). First, the evidence is strongly
indicative of a negative relationship between inflation and long-term growth even at
moderate rates of inflation of 10-30 per cent. High rates of inflation are definitively
harmful to growth. Second, growth falls steeply as inflation exceeds 30--40 per cent and
tends strongly to become negative at very high rates of inflation. Third, reduction of high
inflation has been a precondition for the revival of growth. Annual inflation has to be
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reduced to less than 50 per cent for growth to resume. The implications of these findings
for Nigeria is clear.

Functions of the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN)
We have discussed in a paintbrush version the overall functions of central banks
throughout the world. We need to come home to Nigeria for some specifics even though
generally speaking the functions the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) are not different from
those enumerated above. In a way too, the functions of the CBN can be said to evolve over
time. The functions of the CBN are defined in the objectives of the Bank as defined in
section 4 of the 1958 Ordinance:
(1) to issue legal tender currency in Nigeria;
(2) to maintain external reserves in order to safeguard the international value of the
currency;
(3) to promote monetary stability and a sound financial structure in Nigeria; and
(4) to act as banker and financial adviser to the Federal Government.

Over time, the functions of the Central Bank of Nigeria has &en broadened, so also
have the instruments of monetary control. Since inception, the Bank broadly interprets the
objectives of its monetary policy function to include (Oke, 1995): ·
(i) the achievement of relative stability of domestic prices;_
(ii) the maintenance of a healthy balance of payments position and a stable
exchange rate;
(iii) the promotion of a rapid and sustainable rate of economic growth and
development; and
(iv) the development of a sound financial system.
Some of the functions of the Central Bank of Nigeria are summarised below2.

(i)

Banker and Adviser to the Government: The 1958 CBN Act and CBN Decree of
1991 provide that one of the key functions of the CBN shall be to act as banker and
financial adviser to the Federal Government. The CBN maintains federal
government's account and undertakes most government's banking business. Local
and State government, public enterprises and agencies also maintain accounts with the
CBN. In this regard, the CBN has the sole responsibility of receiving and accounting
for the revenues of the federation. The Federal Government in May 1989 directed all
its parastatals and agencies to withdraw their account from commercial banks and
lodge them with the CBN.+
+

Edito r 's Note: This policy has been reversed. Govemment Ministries/A gencies no longer maintain accounts with the CBN, since
end - March, 1999. They now patronise the CommerciaVMerchant Banks oftheir choice.

2.

For detailed discussion, see Ajayi (1995).
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A banker to the federal government, the CBN not only maintains accounts for the
government, it also accepts responsibility for the financing of its expenditure gaps.
Paragraph 35 of the CBN Ordinance 1958, provides that "the Bank shall be entrusted
with the issue and management of Federal Government loans publicly issued in
Nigeria, upon such terms and conditions as may be agreed between the Federal
Government and the Bank". In this regard, the CBN grants financial accommodation
through the granting of Ways and Means Advances facility. The CBN mobilizes funds
for the Federal Government through the issuance of government securities, such as
treasury bills and certificates, development bonds, treasury bonds, etc. In this manner,
the CBN manages government's domestic and external debt in conjunction with the
Federal Ministry of Finance.
(ii) Banker to other Banks: The CBN Act of 1958 and CBN Decree No. 24 of 1991
(section 37 and 38) clearly specify that the CBN as the apex financial institution must
promote confidence in the financial system through its activities as banker to other
banks and may seek the cooperation of other banks in pursuit of this objective. The
CBN must formulate policies for the introduction of appropriate payments
instruments and supportive of the efficient functioning of the payments system. In this
regard, it facilitates the clearing of cheques and credit instruments through its clearing
houses distributed nationwide. The CBN issues directives on cash reserve and
liquidity ratios, prudential requirements, sectoral credit allocation and on other
activities of banks. This is achieved through its Monetary Policy Guidelines. The
CBN is expected to promote a sound financial system through banking supervision
and examination. This enables the CBN to monitor the activities and performance of
financial institutions on a periodic basis.

(iii) Currency Issue and Distribution: This is one of the oldest functions of the CBN.
The CBN, by law, is the only bank authorised to issue currency. It does not only issue
currency, but the CBN is also involved in its distribution, safe custody of stocks and
management of orders. Without the regular and timely distribution of currency,
economic activities would be disrupted.
(iv) Stable Monetary and Macroeconomic Environment: The CBN Decree of 1991
(No. 24 and 25) states that the Bank's principal objective "shall be to issue legal
tender currency in Nigeria, to maintain external reserves, to safeguard the
international value of the currency, to promote monetary stability and a sound
financial structure in Nigeria". Price stability which is achieved through effective
monetary policy is indispensable for money to perform its role in an economy. The
CBN also sets the growth rate of money supply to be compatible with overall
macroeconomic policy goals. The CBN is expected to monitor and allocate foreign
exchange resources such that foreign exchange a!location and usage are compatible
with macroeconomic objective of government.
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(v) Lender of Last Resort: The CBN grants temporary facilities to banks and discount
houses when they are in liquidity crisis. This assist to give confidence to the financial
system and enhances the banking system's ability to withstand economic shocks.
(vi) Developmental Functions: The developmental activities of the CBN include: the
promotion of the growth of the money and capital markets; promotion of banking
habit; establishment of special schemes and funds, for example, the Agricultural
Credit Guarantee Scheme (ACGS), the National Economic Reconstruction Fund
(NERFUND); promotion of and support for specialised institutions, for instance, the
Nigerian Export Import Bank (NEXIM), Nigerian Deposit Insurance Corporation
(NDIC), etc.
For the purposes of achieving its objectives, in particular that of monetary stability,
an array of tools are available to the bank for monetary control. These include the
following (Falegan, 1995):
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)

variable discount rate, interest rate structure and bank charges
open market operations
variable liquid assets and liquidity ratio
moral suasion ·
selective credit control
(f) cash reserve requirement
(g) special deposits
(h) stabilisation securities.

The 1968 amendments provided additional instruments of monetary control. The
1991 decree provided additional functions for the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN).

IV. CENTRAL BANK'S RELATIONSHIP WITH GOVERNMENT AND THE
ISSUE OF INDEPENDENCE
Over time, there has been discussions about the relationship of the central bank with
Government. The independence of the central bank is often discussed within the context of
the functions it performs. What is the relationship that the central bank should have within
government? Should the central bank be an independent agency established to conduct the
task of administering monetary policy without interference from the executive branch?
Should the central bank be independent from government or be independent within
government?. These are delicate and difficult questions to answer. We attempt here to
address the issue of the independence of central banks. We discuss in what follows the
theoretical issues of central bank independence, the extent of independence and the lack of
it in a number of industrialised countries, the experiences of Nigeria's Central Bank, and
ihe empirical evidences on central bank independence and macroeconomic performance.
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The arguments for central bank independence centres on a number of grounds each of
which has its own merit and demerits. We mention four popular arguments. First, the
control of a nation's monetary system is not only important but too delicate a matter to be
left in the hands of politicians. Given the special nature of the management of money, it
requires the skill and finesse in both financial manipulation and market operation that only
the most skilled experts possess. Second, it is argued that politicians lack the political
courage and the sense of long run responsibility which are necessary to protect the
currency of the nation from abuse and debasement. In a regime of paper money, the
nation's currency is especially vulnerable to maladministration since political control can
lead to inflation. Third, given that a central bank protects the general interest, there may be
situations when government interests, for example, may be in conflict with societal
welfare. This may happen when a central bank is interested for policy purposes in
increasing the rate of interest and government is reluctant because it wants to be able to
borrow cheaply. Fourth, there is need for an independent person outside the government
circle to speak publicly on economic matters.
A number of central banks in the industrial world enjoy independence. This
independence relates to the power to design and implement monetary policy without the
interference of the executive branch. In the United States, for example, the Federal Reserve
undertakes monetary policy formulation and implementation without seeking ratification
from the President or any appointee of the executive branch. The Federal Reserve is
expected by law to report to congress about twice a year.
In Western Germany, the Deutsche Bundesbank has the overall responsibility for
monetary policy. Although the Federal Government owns all the capital of the Bundesbank
from which it receives profit, it does not derive any other privilege from the Bank. The
Bank is not formally accountable to any arm of government but to the General public and
submits an annual report to the government.
The Swiss National Bank is required by regulation to regulate the country's money in
circulation and to facilitate payment transactions. This, the banks understand as facilitating
monetary stability. While there is consultation on policy matters between the Bank and the
Government, approval from Government before implementation of policy is unnecessary
and not required.
At the other end of the continuum of central banks policy and independence are the
Bank of England and the Bank of France. In the United Kingdom, the Treasury and not the
Bank of England has the responsibility for monetary policy. In practice, it is the Treasury
that has the responsibility for monetary polit y while the Bank is the agent that implements
I
monetary policy after close consultation with the Treasury. In France, it is the Ministry of
I
the Economy that decides on the stance of monetary policy. Thus in the legislation of the
Bank of France, responsibility for monetary policy and independence is denied it.
At the beginning of central banking in Nigeria, the inpependence of central bank from
government interference was guaranteed. There was not to be interference from
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Government since the administration of its affairs and business are the responsibility of the
Bank's Board of Directors. All that the act requires is for the Bank to keep the Minister
informed of the monetary and banking policy being pursued; and has no power to delay,
stop or prevent the Bank from carrying out the policy. Theoretically, from the Act therefore
the Central Bank of Nigeria is independent. According to Nwankwo (1980 p. 13), "it can
be argued that, statutorily, the CBN is one of the most independent of central banks in the
world". However, this was in theory. In practice however, the position, dominance and
prestige of the Minister of Finance has always been very important. In this regard, when
the first minister of Finance was alive, he made clear who was the boss. It bas been pointed
out by C.V. Brown (1966) that most of us were under the impression at least from the
budget speeches before 1966, that the Bank operated under the instruction of the Minister
of Finance! He also suggested that if there "were a conflict, the ordinance suggests the
Central Bank should win, but in reality this can by no means be certain" (Brown, 1966 p.
144). It was known from the public speeches of the Prime Minister however that the Bank
was independent within Government. No open confrontation of course ever occurred at
that period between the Minister of Finance and the Governor of the Central Bank.
When the development plan was launched in 1962, divergence of opinion occurred
between the Government and the Central Bank. It was clear that the policy of deficit
financing which government was pursuing was at variance with the Bank's primary
objective of monetary stability. In addition, the Bank called for a general review of tax
incentives and other forms of financial subsidy granted to business as a way of buoying up
Government revenue. There were evidences of struggles between the bank and the
Government in the middle 1960s. The Bank called for a review of the situation and the
result was the CBN Act Amendment Decree No. 3 1968 which gave the last say in policy
matters to the Federal Executive Council. This act is an important watershed on issues
relating to the CBN independence. The relationship between the Ministry of Finance and
the central bank took a new tum with the following provisions (Ajayi, 1978):
1.

The Board (of Directors of the Bank) shall keep the Commissioner of Finance
informed of the monetary and the banking policy pursued or intended to be
pursued by the Central Bank.

2.

The Commissioner shall from time to time if he disagrees with the Board on the
monetary and banking policy pursued so inform the Board of his disagreement
and thereto, and the Minister may submit his representation and that of the Bank
to the Federal Executive Council.

3.

The Federal Executive Council may, in wntmg, after considering the
representation direct the Central Bank as to the monetary and banking policy
pursued or intended to be pursued and the directive shall be binding on the Board
which shall forthwith take all necessary step expedient to give effect thereto.
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In the act, the Commissioner (Minister) of Finance becomes the spokesman in the
Federal Executive Council on issues of monetary policy. The Governor of the Central Bank
cannot reach the Federal Executive Council except through an intermediary, the Minister
of Finance. A situation where the principal adviser to the Government on financial and
monetary affairs cannot reach the Governme nt directly except through an intermediary
(who may hold divergent or opposing views) cannot be regarded as satisfactory
(Nwankwo, 1980). Subsequent happenings have tended to make the central bank not
autonomous in the performance of its duties. Under Decree 24 of 1991, the CBN got its
freedom from the Ministry of Finance and came under the presidency: (1) the CBN
Governor shall keep the President informed of the monetary and banking policy pursued
by the Bank (2) The President after due consideration may in writing direct the Bank as to
the monetary and banking policy pursued or intended to be pursued and the directive shall
be binding on the Board which shall forthwith take all necessary steps or expedient to give
effect thereto. By 1995, the CBN was back under the Ministry of Finance.
In summary, over the years since its inception, the CBN has lost most of its
independent powers to the Ministry of Finance. The Bank has had little or no discretionary
powers in formulating and executing monetary policy. Government fiscal policy overrides
monetary policy (Falegan, 1995). Government excessive spending has limited the success
of the Bank in controlling aggregate credit and monetary aggregates, and hence inflation.
In 1994 for example, 65 per cent of the economy's total credit went to government. Of the
amount that went to government, about 80 per cent came from the Central Bank! Anecdotal
evidences of the behaviour of the central bank under the last regime shows very clearly its
vulnerability and puts to question its leadership role as far as the economy is concerned.
Does the status of central banks (whether they are independent of government) matter
to the outcome of stabilization policies embarked upon the central banks? There are some
empirical evidences on the relationship between central bank independence and
macroeconomic performance. One in which there is abundant evidence is that between
independence of central banks and price stability. The analyses in general tend to show the
existence of a statistically significant relationship between central bank independence and
reduced inflation. When central banks are independent, it is easier to maintain monetary
stability. The results also show that in general, monetary policy was less accommodative
of government deficit financing in countries with more independent central banks.

V.

PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS OF CENTRAL BANKING

In this section, I like to point out some of the problems of the Central Bank of Nigeria
and the challenges that it faces in the year 2000 and beyond. The challenges are more not
only because of the new wind of change under the present political dispensation but
particularly within the context of changes pervading the world's global village of which
Nigeria is a part. We will need to rectify some of the age-long pitfalls in policy formulation
and execution, transparency and accountability. We need more than ever before pro-active
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thinking in terms of developmental process and necessary action. In the earlier years, the
CBN could be said to have performed creditably well in a number of its functions when we
take a look in particular at its promotional roles. There are a number of problems
confronting the financial system today. The economy has no doubt gotten more
complicated in recent years and in particular since the adoption of the structural adjustment
programme. As a result of reliance on the market mechanism, competition among financial
institutions increased. The number of operators increased but also there was a lot of risktaking culminating in excessive non-performing loans. The incidence of fraud and
forgeries also increased. No doubt the Central Bank of Nigeria has gone through turbulent
periods the last few years and in particular in the periods from 1993-98. There are
anecdotal evidences of inability to stand up to the guiding principles of central banking. In
the process of its uncanny accommodation the Central Bank threw into the wind its
professionalism and monetary responsibilities. The maintenance of monetary stability
requires the ability of the Central Bank to put in check the fascination of government with
excessive borrowing from Central Bank.
The Nigerian economy is still a cash-and-carry society. While a number of banks in
some parts of Africa have advanced into the stage of electronic banking system, we are stiJI
where we were some several years back. This is due to lack of trust in the payment
mechanism and underdevelopment of necessary infrastructural facilities. The central bank
should improve the functioning of the payments system through planning and coordination of all activities relating to the payments system. This way, more trust and
confidence in the payment system, coupled with an efficient and smooth functioning of the
payments system can be ensured.
The banking sector witnessed large scale distress since the early 1990s. The distress
is an outgrowth of a number of factors including government's regulatory measures,
management incompetence on the part of banks, government interference in some banks.
It has not been possible to discover the early warning signals of possible distress because
of the poor monitoring system in place. The problems hindering the effective performance
of the supervisory institution include lack of autonomy, ineffective supervison/exarnination
of financial institutions and possible confusion of roles between CBN and NDIC.
Inadequate banking supervision and coordination by the central bank and other regulatory
agencies have contributed to the high incidence of distress of financial institutions. The
financial conditions of banks in Nigeria indicate substantial deterioration. Financial
institutions require supervision from cradle to grave. lmproving the financial condition of
banks through constant monitoring and examination, improving bankruptcy law, timely
prosecution of delinquent borrowers and fraud activitists, and reduction in cost of financial
services will enhance the efficiency of the system. Better regulation and supervision are
key to prevention. The regulation includes not only the licensing but also the imposition of
prudential standards. The financial crisis are not only costly to the economy but also reduce
the effectiveness of monetary policy (Fischer, 1997). They are costly because the volume
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and efficiency of financial intermediation are reduced when banks are distressed and being
closed dn a large scale or they are struggling to strengthen their portfolios. The
effectiveness of monetary policy is impaired because banks which are in trouble do not
respond appropriately to interest rate changes. Additionally, the central bank has to
exercise caution in using monetary policy for fear of damaging fragile banks.
One of the greatest challenges facing the central bank in its future monetary policy in
this economy is to bring inflation under control, stimulate output and employment, and
foster financial deepening. These are no mean tasks and yet very desirable for the economy.
This brings me now again to the issue of the relationship between the Federal
Ministry of Finance and the Governor of the Central Bank. It is possible for the central
bank to be independent within the government and carry out the design and its monetary
policy execution with a high degree of professionalism as in other central banks around the
world. For the central bank to maintain monetary stability, it must be in a position to put a
"stop" to government's insatiable appetite for excessive credit.
Before concluding, let me mention two very important developments which are likely
to test the will and ability of the Central Bank of Nigeria in the future. The first relates to
the issue of financing development in Africa. The traditional sources of finance for
development, official development assistance, has been drying up. The need to look for
alternative and sustainable sources of finance has become imperative. Some of the sources
that are being discussed include foreign direct investment flows, and capital flight reversal.
Both of these flows have implication for macroeconomic stability and have to be managed
properly. Second, the Asian financial crisis informs us that weak financial structure can at
best compound the problem of economic management. There is need therefore to
modernise the financial sector to catch up with the rapid expansion of private capital. It
also informs us of the need to look critically at the applicability of the liberalisation of
capital account in an environment of volatile international capital flows3 .

3. For details on this and other issues stt S. /bi Ajay i, The Challengu of FiluJncing Development in Africa, United Notions Economic
Commission for Africa Discussion paper series ESPDIDPS/9912, su also paper of the same title presented for the Joint Conference
of African Ministers of Finance and Ministers of Economic Planning, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, April, 1999.
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